AADL is a standard for modeling embedded systems that is widely used in avionics and other safety-critical applications. However, the AADL standard lacks at present a formal semantics, and this severely limits both unambiguous communication among model developers, and the development of simulators and formal analysis tools. In this work we present a formal real-time rewriting logic semantics for a behavioral subset of AADL which includes the essential aspects of its behavior annex. Our semantics is directly executable in Real-Time Maude and provides an AADL simulator and LTL model checking tool called AADL2Maude. AADL2Maude is integrated with OSATE, so that OSATE's code generation facility is used to automatically transform AADL models into their corresponding Real-Time Maude specifications. Such transformed models can then be executed and model checked by Real-Time Maude. We present our semantics, and two case studies in which safety-critical properties are verified in AADL2Maude.
Introduction
AADL [15] is both a modeling language for real-time embedded systems and an international standard widely used in industry. It has good features to model the real-time aspects of embedded systems and to represent both the software and hardware architectures of the components making up such systems. It does however lack at present a formal semantics. This lack is particularly important for real-time embedded systems, because many of them -in areas such as avionics, motor vehicles, and medical systems-are safety-critical systems, whose failures may cause great damage to persons and/or valuable assets. Indeed such systems are often required to pass stringent processes of certification to provide sufficiently strong evidence about their safety. Furthermore, AADL models are not executable, which limits not just the possibility of formal analysis of their safety and liveness properties, but even the possibility of simulating them.
It seems clear that overcoming these limitations of AADL is highly desirable, but requires in an essential way the use of formal methods, because in the absence of a precise mathematical semantics any pretense of achieving formal verification is meaningless. Furthermore, these formal methods should be supported by tools that are integrated into the AADL tool chain. A further, highly desirable goal is to have a formal semantics of AADL that can be used to automatically generate formal executable specifications of AADL models, since the first and most basic way of analyzing AADL models should be the capacity to simulate such models; and since such formal executable specifications can then also be used for automatic verification of safety and liveness properties by model checking.
There isn't of course a single choice of a formal framework in which to first define a formal semantics for AADL and then support both simulation and formal analysis of AADL models. What we have is a spectrum of choices, each with its specific advantages and its possible limitations. This technical report describes our experience in defining a formal semantics for a substantial subset of AADL in the Real-Time Maude formal specification language [14] ; and in directly using such a formal semantics to simulate and formally analyze AADL models. We have found the rewriting logic formal framework supported by Real-Time Maude particularly well suited for this task for the following reasons:
-Real-time formalism. All real-time aspects of AADL can be directly and naturally formally modeled by means of real-time rewrite theories. -Support for nested objects. AADL models are structured in nested hierarchies of components. Much would be lost in translation if such structure were not preserved. Real-Time Maude's support for object classes with a "Russian dolls" nested structure (see [10] ) provides an essentially isomorphic formal counterpart for an AADL model. This is important to achieve a small representational distance between an AADL model and its corresponding formal specification, and to be able to map back simulation and formal analysis results from the formal specification to the original model for diagnostic purposes. -Wide range of formal analysis capabilities. By automating the AADL formal semantics with the AADL2Maude tool, one can automatically generate formal executable specifications of AADL models in Real-Time Maude for simulation, reachability analysis, and LTL model checking purposes.
One potential limitation of the Real-Time Maude framework is that, because of its flexibility to represent many communication models, object architectures, and unbounded algebraic data structures, in general its specifications fall outside the automata-theoretic decidable fragments for real-time model checking. However, because of the routine use of nested object hierarchies and of different data structures in AADL itself, plus the need for formal properties involving such structures, we doubt that AADL models can be faithfully modeled in automatabased formalisms, although it may be possible to model abstractions of such models for restricted subsets of AADL. Furthermore, the lack of decidability for general Real-Time Maude models is substantially compensated for by the decidability of time-bounded LTL properties for a wide class of models, including a large class of object-oriented systems, under mild checkable conditions [13] . Our Contribution. Our main contributions are: (i) a formal semantics for a substantial subset of AADL, including the most essential aspects of AADL's behavior annex ; (ii) the AADL2Maude tool, automating the generation of Real-Time Maude specifications for AADL models in OSATE based on such a semantics and supporting simulation, reachability and LTL model checking analyses; and (iii) two case studies, one on safe interoperation of medical devices and one on the safety of avionics systems, demonstrating the usefulness of this semantics and tools in concrete examples. This work should be seen in the context of other recent approaches to the formal analysis of AADL models [2, 7, 1, 18, 17] , which are further discussed in Section 5. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the only one to date to provide an intuitive semantics, preserving the components' hierarchical structure, and also simulation and LTL model checking capabilities for AADL behavioral models in its behavior annex, as opposed to approaches that specify AADL model behavior in formalisms external to AADL. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to AADL and Real-Time Maude. Section 3 presents the Real-Time Maude semantics of a behavioral subset of AADL, and shows how AADL models can be formally analyzed in AADL2Maude. Section 4 reports on the verification of the avionics active standby example. Section 5 discusses related work on formalizing fragments of AADL, and Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
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Preliminaries on AADL and Real-Time Maude

AADL
The SEA Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL) [15, 16] is an industrial standard used in avionics, aerospace, automotive, and robotics communities to describe a performance-critical embedded real-time system as an assembly of software components mapped onto an execution platform.
An AADL model describes a system as a hierarchy of hardware and software components. A component is defined by its name, its interface consisting of input and output ports, its subcomponents and their interaction, and other type-specific properties. System components are the top-level components, and can consist of other system components as well as of hardware and software components. Hardware components include: processor components that schedule and execute threads; memory components; device components representing devices like sensors and actuators that interface with the environment; and bus components that interconnect processors, memory, and devices. Software components include: thread components modeling the application software to be executed; process components defining protected memory that can be accessed by its thread subcomponents; and data components representing data types. In AADL, thread behavior is typically described using AADL's behavior annex [5] , which models programs as transition systems with local state variables.
An AADL model specifies how the different components interact and are integrated to form a complete system. The AADL standard also describes the runtime mechanisms for handling message and event passing, synchronized access to shared resources, thread scheduling when several threads run on the same processor, and dynamic reconfiguration that are specified by mode transitions.
AADL has a MOF meta-model, and the OSATE modeling environment provides a set of plug-ins for front-end processing of AADL models on top of the Eclipse platform.
Rewriting Logic, Maude, and Real-Time Maude
Rewriting Logic and Maude. A Maude [4] module specifies a rewrite theory of the form (Σ, E ∪ A, R), where (Σ, E ∪ A) is a theory in membership equational logic [8] , with Σ a signature, E a set of conditional equations and memberships, and A a set of equational axioms such as associativity, commutativity, and identity, so that equational deduction is performed modulo the axioms A. The theory (Σ, E ∪ A) specifies the system's state space as an algebraic data type. R is a collection of labeled conditional rewrite rules specifying the system's local transitions, each of which has the form
where l is a label. Intuitively, such a rule specifies a one-step transition from a substitution instance of t to the corresponding substitution instance of t , provided the condition holds. The rules are implicitly universally quantified by the variables appearing in the Σ-terms t, t , u i , v i , w j , and w j . The rules are applied modulo the equations E ∪ A. 4 We briefly summarize the syntax of Maude. Operators are introduced with the op keyword. They can have user-definable syntax, with underbars '_' marking the argument positions, and are declared with the sorts of their arguments and the sort of their result. Some operators can have equational attributes, such as assoc, comm, and id, stating, for example, that the operator is associative and commutative and has a certain identity element. Such attributes are then used by the Maude engine to match terms modulo the declared axioms. There are three kinds of logical statements, namely, equations-introduced with the keywords eq, or, for conditional equations, ceq-memberships-declaring that a term has a certain sort and introduced with the keywords mb and cmb-and rewrite rules-introduced with the keywords rl and crl. The mathematical variables in such statements are declared with the keywords var and vars. An equation f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) = t with the owise (for "otherwise") attribute can be applied to a subterm f (. . .) only if no other equation with left-hand side f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) can be applied. 5 In object-oriented Maude modules one can declare classes and subclasses. A class declaration class C | att 1 : s 1 , ... , att n : s n .
declares an object class C with attributes att 1 to att n of sorts s 1 to s n . An object of class C in a given state is represented as a term
where O is the object's name, and where val 1 to val n are the current values of the attributes att 1 to att n . In an object-oriented system, the state, which is usually called a configuration, is a term of the built-in sort Configuration. It has typically the structure of a multiset made up of objects and messages. Multiset union for configurations is denoted by a juxtaposition operator (empty syntax) that is declared associative and commutative and having the none multiset as its identity element, so that order and parentheses do not matter, and so that rewriting is multiset rewriting supported directly in Maude. The dynamic behavior of concurrent object systems is axiomatized by specifying each of its concurrent transition patterns by a rewrite rule. For example, the rule rl [l] : < O : C | a1 : 0, a2 : y, a3 : w, a4 : z > => < O : C | a1 : T, a2 : y, a3 : y + w, a4 : z > defines a parameterized family of transitions (one for each substitution instance) which can be applied whenever the attribute a1 of an object O of class C has the value 0, with the effect of altering the attributes a1 and a3 of the object. "Irrelevant" attributes (such as a4, and the right-hand side occurrence of a2) need not be mentioned in a rule. A subclass inherits all the attributes and rules of its superclasses.
Object-Oriented Specification in Real-Time Maude. Real-Time Maude [14] is a high-performance tool that extends Maude to support the formal specification and analysis of object-based real-time systems. A Real-Time Maude timed module specifies a real-time rewrite theory [12] , that is, a rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪ A, R), such that: where t and t are terms of sort Configuration, { } is a built-in constructor of a new sort GlobalSystem, and where u is a term of sort Time denoting the duration of the rewrite.
The initial state of a real-time system so specified must be reducible to a ground term {t 0 } using the equations in the specification. The form of the tick rules then ensures uniform time elapse in all parts of a system. Real-Time Maude's timed "fair" rewrite command simulates one behavior of the system up to a certain duration. It is written with syntax
where t is the initial state and τ is a ground term of sort Time.
Real-Time Maude's timed search command uses a breadth-first strategy to search for states that are reachable from a given initial state t within time τ , match a search pattern, and satisfy a search condition. The command which searches for one state satisfying the search criteria has syntax (tsearch [1] t =>* pattern such that cond in time <= τ .)
Real-Time Maude also extends Maude's linear temporal logic model checker [3] to check whether each behavior from a given initial state satisfies a temporal logic formula. 
Overview of a Behavioral Subset of AADL
This section gives an overview of the subset of AADL for which we have defined a rewriting logic semantics.
Components. In AADL, a system is modeled as a collection of software and hardware components. Since we have focused on the software parts of AADL, the following description only deals with the software components and features. A component is given by its type and its implementation. A component type specifies the component's interface in terms of features and properties. In the software portion, features are just input and output ports. Properties support specialized modeling and analysis capabilities that can be defined in AADL annexes. A component implementation specifies the internal structure of the component in terms of a set of subcomponents, a set of connections linking the ports of the subcomponents, and modes that represent operational states of components (see below).
System components are the top level software components. A process component contains a set of thread components that together define the dynamic behavior of the process. Port Connections. Port connections link ports to enable the exchange of data and events among components. Ports are directional. An out port represents output provided by the sender, and an in port represents input needed by the receiver. A port is either a data port, an event port, or an event data port. Each port is accessible through its buffer. Buffers of event ports and event data ports support queueing of, respectively, "events" and message data, while buffers of data ports only keep the latest data. In addition, each thread port is associated to an internal buffer, which is accessible by the thread. The dequeue protocol attribute determines how many elements in the port buffer are transferred to the thread's internal buffer when a thread is dispatched.
A level-up connection links an outgoing port in a subcomponent to an outgoing port in the containing component. A level-down connection links an incoming port of a component to an incoming port in one of its subcomponents. A samelevel connection connects an outgoing port of a component to incoming ports of another component at the same level in the containment hierarchy. AADL supports 1-to-n connectivity for event and event data ports at the same level.
Modes. Modes represent the operational states of components. A component can have mode-specific property values, subcomponents, and connections. Mode transitions are triggered by events. In the following example, a simplified blood pressure monitor process has two modes, fast and slow. The fast and slow modes have their own implementations, sending out the requestbp signal every 100, respectively 1000, milliseconds. An incoming event through the port modechange results in mode switch between slow mode and fast mode. (We do not support at the moment some other features of modes, such as, e.g., the "applies to" construct, where the properties of a subcomponent are directly modified as a result of a mode change in one of its supercomponents.)
Dispatch Protocols. The dispatch protocol property of a thread determines when the thread is executed. A periodic thread is activated at time intervals of the specified period T ; an aperiodic thread is activated when an event arrives at a port of the thread; a sporadic thread is activated when an event arrives and the interval between two dispatches is at least T ; and a background thread is (re-)activated upon the completion of execution.
Behavioral Annex. The dynamic behavior of a thread is defined in AADL using AADL's behavioral annex [5] . Given a finite set of states (or locations), and a set of state variables, the dynamic behavior of a thread is defined by a set of guarded state transitions of the form
where s and s are states, and where the guard is a boolean condition on the values of the state variables and/or the presence of events or data in the thread's input ports. The actions that are performed when a transition is applied may update the state variables, generate new output events and/or data, and/or suspend the thread for a given amount of time. Actions are built from basic actions using a small set of control structures allowing sequencing, conditionals, and finite loops.
When a thread is activated, an enabled transition is nondeterministically selected and applied; if the resulting state s is not a complete state, another transition is applied, and so on, until a complete state is reached (or the thread is suspended).
Value Constraints. In embedded applications, such as the active standby system discussed in Section 4, the environment interacting with sensors and actuators can be modeled as a special "environment" component that nondeterministically generates events.
Typically, the data/events from the environment are interdependent, so that not all possible combinations of values are legal inputs from the environment. Using the fact that we can define new properties in AADL, Abdullah Al-Nayeem has extended AADL with a property feature to express such constraints on a set of values. For example, in the avionics example in Section 4, the environment sends five boolean-valued signals in each period. One of these reports whether or not side 1 has failed; another signal reports whether side 2 has failed. It is assumed that both sides cannot fail at the same time. Hence, the input from the environment in each round is a five-tuple (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b 5 ) satisfying the value constraint (b 1 ∨ b 2 ). See Section 4 for more details.
An AADL Example. As a small example of an AADL specification within our targeted subset of AADL, consider a system consisting of a controller, a ventilator machine that assists a patient's breathing during surgery, and an Xray device. Whenever a button is pushed to take an X-ray, and the ventilator machine has not paused sometime in the past 10 minutes, the ventilator machine should pause for two seconds, starting one second after the button is pushed, and the X-ray should be taken after two seconds. To execute the system, we also add a test activator that pushes the button every second.
The following AADL model was developed by Min-Young Nam.
The entire system Wholesys is a closed system that does not have any features (i.e., ports) to the outside world. Hence, its type (interface) is empty: system Wholesys end Wholesys;
The implementation of the entire system describes the architecture of the system, with four subcomponents and the connections linking these subcomponents: The test activator TestActivator, whose job it is to generate an event every second, is an instance of a system of type TA, having as interface the output port pressEvent:
system TA features pressEvent: out event data port Behavior::integer; end TA;
Its implementation consists of a single process taPr, which is an instance of taProcess.impl: system implementation TA.impl subcomponents taPr: process taProcess.impl; connections C90: event data port taPr.pressEvent -> pressEvent; end TA.impl;
A taProcess.impl itself consists of a single thread taTh: process taProcess features pressEvent: out event data port Behavior::integer; end taProcess; process implementation taProcess.impl subcomponents taTh: thread taThread.impl; connections C91: event data port taTh.pressEvent -> pressEvent; end taProcess.impl;
The thread taTh is dispatched periodically, with a period of one second. When the thread is dispatched, the single transition is applied once (since the resulting state s0 is a complete state), and the action performed is to output the value 1 through the output port pressEvent: The other components are defined in a similar way. The following presents the implementation of the X-ray machine thread, which shows a transition system with state variables, and where each transition guard contains a test on the existence of events/data in the input ports, and on the value of the data received (inMessage). Since the Dispatch_Protocol is aperiodic, this thread is activated upon receiving input: 
Real-Time Maude Semantics of AADL
AADL is a modeling notation whose standard is described informally in English without a precise semantics. Unavoidably this means that there are various ambiguities in the standard, including its behavioral annex. However, formal specification and analysis are meaningless without a precise semantics. This section outlines the rewriting logic semantics for the behavioral subset of AADL presented in Section 3.1. We show first how an AADL model can be represented in Real-Time Maude, and then define the dynamics of AADL for models that use the behavioral annex.
Representing AADL Models in Real-Time Maude
Components. The semantics of a component-based language such as AADL can naturally be defined in an object-oriented style, where each instance of a component is modeled as an object. The hierarchical structure of AADL components is reflected in the nested ("Russian dolls") structure of objects, in which an attribute of an object/component contains the subcomponents of the object as a multiset of objects.
Any AADL component instance is represented as an object instance of a subclass of the following class Component, which contains the attributes common to all kinds of components (systems, processes, threads, etc.): The attribute features denotes the features of a component (i.e., its ports), represented as a multiset of Port objects (see below). The subcomponents attribute denotes the multiset of subcomponents of the object. The connections attribute denotes the set of port connections of the objects (see below). The properties attribute denotes the properties of the component, which in our case are the dispatch protocol and the value constraints for thread components. The modes attribute contains the object's mode transition system. Finally, the inModes attribute gives the set of modes (of the immediate containing component) in which the component is available (if the component is not a mode-specific subcomponent of the containing component, then this attribute has the special value allModes).
For our chosen subset of AADL, the classes System and Process, denoting system and process components, do not have any other attributes than those they inherit from Component:
subclass System < Component . class Process .
subclass Process < Component .
The Thread class is the following subclass of Component:
class Thread | behavior : ThreadBehavior, status : ThreadStatus, threadType : ThreadName, implementationType : ImplName, deactivated : Bool .
subclass Thread < Component .
The behavior attribute denotes the locations and the state variables and their values of the transition system associated with the thread. To avoid carrying around the (sometimes quite large) set of transitions associated with the thread, the transitions themselves are defined as the value of the expression transitions(threadT ype,implN ame). To access its transitions, a thread object must therefore contain its threadName and implName. The status indicates the current status of the thread (active, completed, suspended, etc.). The attribute deactivated indicates whether the thread is deactivated as a result of a mode transition somewhere in the component hierarchy.
Ports. Any port is an object instance of a subclass of the following class Port, whose only attribute denotes the list of messages (events or data) currently in the port's buffer:
class Port | buffer : MsgList .
Several subclasses of Port define outgoing and incoming ports, as well as event ports and event data ports. The subclass InThreadPort also contains an internalBuffer and a fresh flag (which indicates whether there are new messages in the thread's internal buffer that have not yet been treated). In addition, the dequeueProtocol is defined in the InEventThreadPort. It determines how many items are dequeued from the buffer when a thread dispatches: An (immediate) level-up connection is therefore modeled as a term C.P --> P , where C is the identifier of the subcomponent in which the source port with identifier P resides. The destination port is the port with name P in the "current" component. Likewise, immediate same-level and level-down connections are terms of the forms, respectively, P 1 --> P 2 and P --> C.P . We have not yet defined the semantics of delayed connections.
Connections can be mode-specific; such connections are defined as terms of the form P --> P in modes (m k . . . m l ):
Representing Thread Behavior. As mentioned above, to save space in the term representation of an AADL component by not carrying around the transition rules, which do not change, of a thread in its state, we divide the representation of the transition system associated with a thread into two parts: We have also defined some additional "syntactic sugar" functions (e.g., allowing the definition of initial states, for skipping the declaration of the store when no state variables are declared, etc.) that reduce to terms of the above form.
The set of transitions, locations, and variable mappings have the structure of a multiset, using a binary multiset union operator that is declared to be associative and commutative. For example, the set of transitions is defined as follows: As already mentioned, the transition table is given by the function transitions having the memo attribute, which means that the transitions for each thread implemented are memorized: This declaration binds the name to a set of ports and properties. We can therefore consider system as a function that, given a name, returns the interface of that name: This scheme applies in exactly the same way to the other kinds of components (Process and Thread), so that the AADL model and its Real-Time Maude representation are textually fairly similar, as shown in the following example. is translated line by line into the Real-Time Maude equations eq system(TA) = features (pressEvent out event data port) . eq INSTANCE-NAME system TA . impl in modes MNS = < INSTANCE-NAME : System | modes : noModes, inModes : MNS, features : features(system(TA)), subcomponents : (taPr process taProcess . impl), connections : (taPr . pressEvent --> pressEvent), properties : properties(system(TA)) > .
where pressEvent out event data port equals a port object accordining the following definition:
op _out'event'data'port : PortId -> Object . eq P:PortId out event data port = < P:PortId : OutEventDataPort | buffer : nil > .
In the same style, we can define the translation of the test activator thread implementation. In AADL, this thread is defined as follows: It is worth noticing that the deactivated attribute was not defined in the above equations, since it is impossible to see from only the definition of the thread type and implementation whether or not a thread is initially deactivated. This is due to the fact that deactivation may follow from mode-specific components much higher in the containment hierarchy. A function initializeThreads is therefore applied to fully define the initial state by defining the initial deactivated value for each thread object.
Dynamics. This section formalizes the operational semantics of AADL in Real-Time Maude. Unavoidably, since AADL does not have a precise semantics, our semantic definitions are a formal semantics for AADL and involve an interpretation of what the informal and sometimes ambiguous descriptions in the standard mean. The dynamics is defined by equations and rewrite rules specifying:
-"message" transportation, mode switches, thread dispatch, thread execution, nondeterministically assigning values to a set of variables, given a value constraint, and timed behavior.
Message Passing. In the spirit of the "traditional" Maude model for message transmission -where message transmission from source to destination is abstractly modeled by the state having a multiset structure -we use equations to model the transmission of messages from source port to destination port along a series of connections.
To transmit a list M L of messages (that is, events and/or data), an out port puts transfer(M L) into its buffer. The following equation models the transmission of a message list along a level-up connection C1 . P1 --> P from the out port P1 of the subcomponent C1 to the out port P of the supercomponent C. As a result of applying the equation, the port P now has the value transfer(M L), and the subcomponent's port buffer is empty: The following equation models the transmission of a message list following a same-level connection between the two subcomponents C1 and C2: This is a somewhat simplified version of the equations we actually use, since we also allow 1-to-n same-level connections as well as mode-specific connections.
Finally, the following equation models the transmission of a list of messages along a level-down connection. It is similar to a level-up connection, the only difference being that the destination may already have some buffer contents; therefore, the list to be transferred is just appended to the buffer of the destination port: Thread Status and Mode Switches. The execution status of a thread can be any of the following:
Active: The thread is ready to execute a state transition. Completed: The thread has completed its execution in this dispatch and waits for its next dispatch. Sleeping: The thread is suspended, and will resume execution after a given amount of time. Inactive: The thread is not part of the "active" mode of the system.
A mode switch has the effect of deactivating and activating threads to respond to dispatches. A thread becomes inactive as the result of a mode change if it is not part of the new mode. An inactive thread cannot be dispatched for execution. An inactive thread can be activated as the result of a mode change, in which case the thread enters the completed status, from where it can respond to future dispatches. When a thread in the completed status receives a dispatch request, the thread enters the active status to perform the computation. Upon successful completion of the computation, the thread returns to the completed status. Once an active thread executes a delay action, it enters the sleeping status, suspends for a period of time, and becomes active after that time period.
Mode switch is modeled by the following rewrite rule: where the modeSwitch operation propagates the mode switch request to the subcomponents (by setting deactivated to true for the other threads to be suspended; and vice versa for the threads that should be activated).
Thread Dispatch and Execution. Under a periodic dispatch protocol, a thread in completed status is dispatched when the "dispatch timer," i.e., the second parameter T' in the term periodic-dispatch(T,T'), is 0. As a result, the thread is dispatched, that is, its status is set to active, the "timer" is reset to the length T of a period, and the input ports are "dispatched" as well: Likewise, when the dispatch protocol is aperiodic, and new events have arrived in some of the thread's input ports (that is, some of the messages in the port buffer have the wrapper transfer), and the thread is in completed status, then the thread is activated: The next rule specifies the execution of an active thread. If the thread is in state L1, and there is some transition from L1 whose guard evaluates to true, then the transition is executed. The resulting status is sleeping(...) if some of the actions in the statement list SL are delay statements, the thread is completed or suspended if the resulting state L2 is a complete state, and remains active otherwise: The function executeTransition executes a given transition in a state with a given set PORTS of ports and assignment VAL of the state variables. Its definition is straight-forward. The function returns a triple transResult(p, σ, t), where p is the state of the ports after the execution, σ is the resulting values of the state variables, and t is the sum of the delays in the transition actions. The transitions are modeled as a multiset of single transitions; therefore, any of the enabled transitions can be nondeterministically selected in the matching condition in the above rule.
The following rule models the behavior of a sleeping thread when the remaining sleeping time is 0. The thread becomes active, completed, or suspended depending on whether or not its current state is a complete state and, if so, whether it should deactivate itself as a result of an earlier mode switch: Value Constraints. Consider again an "environment" thread which is supposed to nondeterministically generate n boolean values b 1 , . . . , b n , satisfying a constraint ϕ(b 1 , . . . , b n ), for its n boolean state variables. A straight-forward solution is to initialize each b i to some "uninitialized" value, and then have two rules which assign an uninitialized boolean variable the values true and false, respectively. However, since the number of Boolean vectors is exponential on the number of Boolean variables, this can quickly become too inefficient, since it will generate too many assignments which do not satisfy ϕ. We instead take advantage of Maude SAT solving features to easily define a function to generate the set of all possible variable assignments satisfying ϕ, and then have a rule that can nondeterministically select any of these assignments.
In our model, the sort Valuation defines a variable map. Sets of such variable maps can then be defined using an associative and commutative set union operator _;;_: the variable NEW-ASSIGNMENT can match any of the maps defined by allAssignments(...,ϕ). The point is that such an assignment should be done each time a thread is dispatched, that is, each time the thread goes from completed to active.
We have implemented this technique, and it has given us improved performance in the avionics case study reported in Section 4. For further efficiency:
-The set of all legal assigments is not stored in the states; instead the function allAssignments is called each time a new variable assignment is selected. -The frequently called function allAssignments is declared to have the attribute memo, so that the results of its computations are memorized by Maude (see [4] ). Therefore, after the first computation of allAssignments(V,ϕ) each subsequent "computation" of allAssignments(V,ϕ) takes time O(1).
Time Behavior. Following the specification techniques proposed in [14] , we model time elapse The function delta defines the effect of time elapse in a system, and the function mte defines the maximum time elapse possible until an action must be taken. The rule then advances time nondeterministically by some time less than or equal to the maximum possible time elapse.
These functions are declared as follows: The important time behaviors that must be taken into account when defining these functions are:
-Periodic threads must dispatch at the given time. delta is defined in the same way for Process objects. For Thread objects, the delta function must decrease the possible "timers" as described below, taking into account the possibility that some of these "timers" are mode-specific properties: As for the function mte, it does not affect System or Process objects, but must ensure that mte is 0 when an "untreated" message list, that is, one of the form transfer(ml), is present in some port buffer; in addition, it must ensure that time cannot advance beyond the time at which a sleeping thread should wake up, or beyond the time at which a periodic thread should dispatch. In addition, time cannot advance when a thread is active: 
Formal Analysis of AADL Models in Real-Time Maude
This section illustrates how the Real-Time Maude module corresponding to an AADL model can be formally analyzed. In particular, we present some helpful functions allowing the user to define desired properties without having to understand the details of the Real-Time Maude representation of an AADL component.
Defining Initial
States. An AADL system definition declares a template for the component. An initial state is an instance of such a template. For example, in our medical example, assuming that MAIN is a constant of sort SystemId of System object names, a typical initial state is initializeThreads({MAIN system Wholesys . impl})
A first form of formal analysis consists of simulating one of the many possible system behaviors up to a given duration using timed rewriting: 7
Maude> (tfrew initializeThreads({MAIN system Wholesys . impl}) in time < 20 .)
Reachability Analysis. Real-Time Maude's tsearch, respectively utsearch, command can be used to analyze whether or not a state matching a given pattern and satisfying a given condition pattern can be reached from a given initial state within a given time interval, respectively without any time limit.
Defining gives the current location/state in the transition system in the given thread. We have also defined useful functions for extracting the contents of port buffers, as well as the content of a thread's internal port buffer, by way of two functions getBuffer and getInternalBuffer. equals the current location (or "state") in the thread xmTh in the (initial) state (MAIN system Wholesys . impl).
The system of medical devices described in Section 3.1 is supposed to achieve that the ventilator machine is pausing when an X-ray is being taken, so that the X-ray is not blurred. The following Real-Time Maude time-bounded search command analyzes this property by checking whether an undesired state, namely one where the X-ray device thread xmTh is in state xray while the ventilator thread vmTh is not in state paused, can be reached from the initial state {MAIN system Wholesys . impl} in less than 4 time units: LTL Model Checking. As already mentioned in Section 2.2, Real-Time Maude is equipped with an explicit-state linear termporal logic (LTL) model checker that analyzes whether all behaviors (possibly up to a given duration) from the initial state satisfy an LTL formula. Again, we have pre-defined useful atomic propositions, such as getBuffer(full port name), getInternalBuffer(full port name), and full thread name @ location. The latter holds when the thread is in state location and is defined as follows: Example 3. We can use the LTL model checker to analyze two desired properties of our medical system: 1. The ventilation machine must be pausing when an X-ray is being taken. 2. Since the button is pushed at time 0, an X-ray should be taken within three seconds of the start of the system.
The first property, which has already been subjected to reachability analysis, can be model checked by the following untimed model checking command: The second requirement amounts to checking the time-bounded liveness property that the xmTh thread will always reach its xray state within 3 time units: Surprisingly, this latter model checking command returned a counterexample demonstrating that the expected property does not hold for all behaviors from the initial state. Analyzing the counterexample revealed a previously unknown faulty behavior, where, due to some subtle timer issues, the X-ray machine thinks that it has already taken an X-ray even though it is only waiting to take an X-ray.
The AADL2Maude Tool
The above semantics of AADL has been automated in the AADL2Maude tool.
AADL2Maude is an OSATE plug-in that uses OSATE's code generation facility to automatically generate Real-Time Maude specifications from AADL models. The executable, formal semantics of AADL models has been integrated into the OSATE environment, enabling techniques for verifying critical properties over AADL specifications. An AADL specification is usually defined in OSATE in either textual or graphical format. The abstract syntax of AADL and of its Behavioral Annex are defined as MOF metamodels. OSATE parses AADL specifications and obtains AADL models, which conform to the metamodels above, that represent their abstract syntax trees.
Our tool adds a model compiler to OSATE as a plugin that, given an AADL specification, automatically generates a formal, executable, Real-Time Maude model corresponding exactly to its rewrting logic semantics. This is obtained by means of the function mapping the model M AADL to a real-time rewrite theory M AADL . The function has been implemented using OSATE's traversal mechanisms mapping each object in an AADL model to an element of a Real-Time Maude theory as explained in Section 3.2. Our approach allows an AADL modeler to work with AADL models as mathematical entities within the OSATE environment itself, thus enhancing the application of the analysis techniques supported in Real-Time Maude.
An Active Standby System Example
In order to further illustrate how AADL design can benefit from Maude-based formal analysis using the AADL2Maude tool chain, we give an overview of the verification of another example, an Active Standby system for deciding which of two computer systems is active in an aircraft. This model is an AADL variant developed by Abdullah Al-Nayeem of a similar active standby specification by Steve Miller and Darren Cofer from Rockwell-Collins. This example and its properties is also discussed in [11] .
The Active Standby System
The Active Standby system is a simplified example of a fault-tolerant Avionics system. In integrated modular avionics (IMA), a cabinet is a chassis with a power supply, internal bus, and general purpose computing, I/O, and memory cards. Aircraft applications are implemented using the resources in the cabinets. There are always two or more cabinets that are physically separated on the aircraft so that physical damage (e.g., an explosion) doesn't take out the computer system. The Active Standby system considers the case of two cabinets and focuses on the logic of deciding which side is active. While one side is active, the other side remains passive. The two sides receive inputs through communication channels. Each side could fail, but it is assumed that both sides cannot fail at the same time. A failed side can recover after failure. In case one side fails, the nonfailed side should be the active side. In addition, the user/pilot can toggle the active status of these sides. Each side is dependent on other system components. In this example, the full functionality of each side is dependent on these two sides' perception of the availability of these system components. Only a fully functional/available side should be active, while the other side is alive but not fully functional. Each side monitors the status of other side and acts upon the monitored result.
Important properties that the Active Standby system should satisfy include:
R 1 : Both sides should agree on which side is active (provided neither side has failed, the availability of a side has not changed, and the pilot has not made a manual selection). R 2 : A side that is not fully available should not be the active side if the other side is fully available (again, provided neither side has failed, the availability of a side has not changed, and the pilot has not made a manual selection). 
AADL Model of the Active Standby System
As already mentioned, the Active Standby system has been modeled in AADL by Abdullah Al-Nayeem. The architecture of the system is shown in Figure 1 . The top-level system specification consists of three AADL system components: Side1, Side2, and Environment. Side1 and Side2 encapsulate the behaviors of the two sides. The Environment component can be considered as an abstract representation of other non-specified components that interact with Side1 and Side2. The behavior of each component is defined by a periodic thread. The AADL design of the Active Standby system is globally synchronous; i.e., all threads inside Side1, Side2, and Environment have the same period and dispatch at the same time. These three components are wrapped in a system component ActiveStandbySystem.
Each time the thread inside Environment dispatches, it sends 5 boolean values, one through each of its out ports shown in Figure 1 . These values are nondeterministically generated, with the constraints that two sides cannot fail
Side1 Side2
Environment side1ActiveSide mon1Side1FullyAvail mon1Side2FullyAvail side2ActiveSide mon2Side1FullyAvail mon2Side2FullyAvail side1Failed side1FullyAvail side2FullyAvail manualSelection side2Failed Fig. 1 . Architecture of the Active Standby system in AADL at the same time, and that the failed side cannot be fully available. These assumptions are specified in AADL as a value constraint property in the thread inside Environment:
PalsProperties::ValueConstraints => "not s1F and s2F and not s2FA or not s2F and s1F and not s1FA or not s1F and not s2F";
Applying the PALS Philosophy to the Active Standby AADL Model
The above-described AADL model of the active standby system is not really synchronous. It is instead an asynchronous model. This is due to semantics of AADL models, since in an AADL model consisting of several threads, each individual thread can perform transitions on its own, leading to an asynchronous and highly concurrent behavior, and therefore to a big state space explosion. Therefore, in a sense the AADL model of the active standby system is halfway between the intended synchronous system and the AADL model resulting from applying the PALS pattern, which is even more complex and of course also asynchronus.
In our own experiments model checking the above, really asynchronous model, we run into a performance barrier both in time and space. It was possible to perform bounded model checking analyses of the model for modest depth bounds, but full model checking analysis was unfeasible. As a sanity check, we also specified directly in Real-Time Maude a, still asynchronous, version of the active standby system. We were able to fully verify all the safety requirements of this Real-Time Maude model in less than a minute. The difference with the performance barriers for the similar AADL version of the model was that, in addition to the asynchrony shared by both models, the AADL model (and therefore also its Real-Time Maude translation) was considerably more complex, with the size of a single AADL model state occupying about six printed pages. In reality, each component is not just a single object, but a relatively large collection of concurrent objects; since each of its gates is itself a nontrivial object containing a buffer and additional state information.
All this means that we were really analyzing the wrong model to begin with, because we were not taking advantage of the PALS methodology [11, 9] . Specifically, as explained in detail in [9] , the PALS transformation applies to any ensemble E of state machines connected by a wiring diagram so that: (i) the single state machine obtained as the synchronous composition of E, and (ii) the asynchronous system obtained by applying to E the PALS transformation (for given parameters of clock skew, local transition times, and maximum network delay) are in fact bisimilar. In particular, both system saisfy the same temporal logic properties [9] , but is of course much easier to model check the synchronous composition, while it is typically unfeasible to model check the corresponding PALS-transformed system. This means that the right AADL model to analyze for a given ensemble E is not its natural asynchronous version, where each machine in E can perform transitions on its own, but instead the AADL model of its synchronous composition.
For the active standby example, what this means is that we should specify the AADL model corresponding to such a synchronous composition. This is exactly what we did, allowing us to model check all the desired safety properties in a few minutes as explained in what follows.
Formal Analysis of the Synchronous AADL Model
Taking the synchronous model of the Active Standby system in AADL as input, the AADL2Maude tool chain automatically generates the corresponding Real-Time Maude specification, a timed object-oriented module ACTIVE-STANDBY--SYSTEM. Then the safety requirements for the Active Standby system are specified and model checked in the MODEL-CHECK-ACTIVE-STANDBY module, which also defines the initial state init:
(tomod MODEL-CHECK-ACTIVE-STANDBY is including AADL-MODEL-CHECKER . including ACTIVE-STANDBY-SYSTEM .
op init : -> GlobalSystem . eq init = initializeThreads{MAIN system ActiveStandbySystem . impl} . ......
endtom)
We use temporal logic formulae to encode requirements R 1 to R 5 . Due to the globally synchronous design of Active Standby, we restrict our attention to the stable state in each period. A state is stable if it is at the moment of dispatch. The notion of a stable state is defined as an atomic proposition stable.
We likewise define the exact meaning of specialized words like active, failed, and changed as atomic propositions. For example, the atomic proposition side1-FullyAvailNow holds if and only if in the thread of Side1, the received message stored in the internal buffer of the in port side1FullyAvail has value true: We combine atomic propositions into more complex LTL formulae, such as NoChangeAssumption, which defines the conditions under which both R 1 and R 2 must hold: A more precise definition of requirement R 1 is that, in a stable state where no assumptions are changed, both sides must agree on active side either in the current state or in the next stable state. This requirement can be formalized as the following temporal logic formula R1: Since the AADL2Maude tool chain automatically generates a Real-Time Maude translation of an AADL model, we could inject formal analysis into the AADL design process of Active Standby. Indeed, the synchronous Active Standby system satisfies all five requirements, as shown by the following model checking command, which took about six minutes to execute:
(mc init |=u (R1 /\ R2 /\ R3 /\ R4 /\ R5) .) rewrites: 277333182 in 373655ms cpu (375661ms real) (742216 rewrites/second)
Result Bool : true
This of course means that the AADL model for the PALS-transformed version of this synchronous model of the active standby system will also satisfy the same safety requirements, even though it is unfeasible to verify this fact directly by model checking on the much more complex PALS-transformed version.
Related Work
The applications of formal methods to analyze AADL models can be divided into two classes: analyzing schedulability of an architectural subset of AADL where thread behavior is only characterized by dispatch protocol and execution time [17, 6] , and analyzing behaviors in behavioral subsets of AADL similar to the one chosen in our work.
For analyzing behaviors of AADL models, the work reported in [2] is the closest to ours. As similar subset of AADL is translated into an extension of Petri nets. Their model checker selt can then be used to analyze abstractions of AADL models, including their LTL properties. However, the paper does not explain their semantics. The paper [7] also covers a similar subset of AADL, except that thread behavior is not given by the behavioral annex, but is instead given as a program in the synchronous language Lustre. In [1] , the authors translate a behavioral subset, minus mode switches, to IF, where they can analyze safety properties of the system. The behaviors are, however, not expressed using AADL's behavioral annex, but their own behavioral language. In [18] , a smaller subset (periodic threads, no modes) is translated to timed abstract state machines, and model checking in the timed automaton tool Uppaal is suggested to verify timing properties.
Conclusions
AADL's current lacks of a formal semantics and of executability are two severe limitations, particularly for certifiable safety-critical embedded systems. In this work we solve these two problems for a substantial subset of AADL by providing a formal rewriting semantics of it in Real-Time Maude, and by deriving from this semantics a tool, AADL2Maude, that connects the OSATE AADL tool with Real-Time Maude and supports simulation, reachability, and LTL model checking analyses of AADL models in this subset. Furthermore, we have illustrated the use of AADL2Maude with two case studies, one of safe medical device interoperation, and another on safety of an avionics system.
Our experience is quite encouraging, but much work remains ahead. Increasingly larger AADL subsets should be given a formal rewriting logic semantics to achieve the goal of giving a formal semantics to the entire AADL standard and having simulation and formal analysis tools for AADL based on such a semantics. Also, further experimentation to extend and perfect our approach should be carried out. We also plan to extend the facilities described in this paper to make it easy for users to specify formal properties of AADL models into an AADL "formal property annex," so that such properties can be expressed solely in terms of the given AADL model.
